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Abstract: 
Collaborating with a supplier in a buying firm’s new product development 
(NPD) project is commonly advocated and adopted, but does not always 
improve project performance. Some pre-existing collaboration contexts, 
such as buyer-supplier NPD projects, are especially exposed to supplier 
opportunism due to the uncertain nature of the collaboration process. 
Adopting agency theory and transaction cost theory (TCT) perspectives, we 
examine (i) contextual antecedents and project consequences of supplier 
opportunism, and (ii) if these causal influences vary in different cultural 
and institutional contexts. Using a survey sample of 214 United States 
(U.S.) and 212 Chinese buying firms’ responses about buyer-supplier NPD 
projects, we find that supplier opportunism is significantly influenced by 
the task and relational contexts. We also show that supplier opportunism 
damages both design quality and efficiency, two aspects of project 
performance. When comparing U.S. to China, we find that task and 
relational contexts have a greater impact on supplier opportunism in the 
U.S., but design efficiency is less hurt by supplier opportunism there. 
Finally, we show challenges of preventing supplier opportunism in certain 
NPD collaboration contexts, and offer solutions for overcoming these 
challenges. 
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SUPPLIER OPPORTUNISM IN BUYER-SUPPLIER NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT: A CHINA-US STUDY OF ANTECEDENTS, CONSEQUENCES AND 
CULTURAL/INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Collaborating with a supplier in a buying firm’s new product development (NPD) project is 
commonly advocated and adopted, but does not always improve project performance. Some pre-
existing collaboration contexts, such as buyer-supplier NPD projects, are especially exposed to 
supplier opportunism due to the uncertain nature of the collaboration process. Adopting agency 
theory and transaction cost theory (TCT) perspectives, we examine (i) contextual antecedents 
and project consequences of supplier opportunism, and (ii) if these causal influences vary in 
different cultural and institutional contexts. Using a survey sample of 214 United States (U.S.) 
and 212 Chinese buying firms’ responses about buyer-supplier NPD projects, we find that 
supplier opportunism is significantly influenced by the task and relational contexts. We also 
show that supplier opportunism damages both design quality and efficiency, two aspects of 
project performance. When comparing U.S. to China, we find that task and relational contexts 
have a greater impact on supplier opportunism in the U.S., but design efficiency is less hurt by 
supplier opportunism there. Finally, we show challenges of preventing supplier opportunism in 
certain NPD collaboration contexts, and offer solutions for overcoming these challenges. 
 
Subject areas: supplier involvement, new product development, supplier opportunism, agency 
theory, transaction cost theory, country, culture, institutions 
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INTRODUCTION 
Supplier involvement in a buying firm’s new product development (NPD) project is widely 
advocated and adopted, but it is sometimes unsuccessful (Primo and Amundson, 2002; 
Koufteros, Rawski and Rupak, 2010). To explain why, the literature primarily focuses on buying 
firm strategies with limited attention to supplier behavior (Hartley, Zirger and Kamath, 1997; 
Koufteros, Vonderembse and Jayaram, 2005). However, case studies suggest that supplier 
opportunism may lead to unsuccessful NPD (van Echtelt, Wynstra, van Weele and Duysters, 
2008). Supplier opportunism, defined as supplier self-interest-seeking behavior with guile, is a 
potential concern for a buying firm when managing its NPD projects (Jap and Anderson, 2003). 
Various forms of this behavior exist, such as supplier shirking responsibilities, hiding or 
providing false information, making hollow promises, or window-dressing efforts. These actions 
increase transaction risks for the buying firm in terms of unsatisfactory return on investment or 
leakage of valuable technology (Helm and Kloyer, 2004). They also create governance 
challenges for a buying firm as it leads the NPD initiatives (Griffith, Harmancioglu and Droge, 
2009; Harmancioglu, 2009). In addition, the buying firm’s responses to supplier opportunism, 
such as lowering commitment and intensifying monitoring, could unintentionally hurt project 
performance (Ulset, 1996; Andrews and Delahaye, 2000).  
 In this study we examine contextual antecedents, performance consequences, and 
moderating factors involving supplier opportunism in buyer-supplier NPD.  
Although supplier opportunism is extensively examined in traditional buyer-supplier 
product transactions, the antecedents of supplier opportunism are not well understood in 
knowledge-intensive exchanges, such as buyer-supplier NPD. The literature on partner 
opportunism in joint innovation primarily examines the effects of governance mechanisms, not 
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the effects of a collaboration context (Ulset, 1996; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2004a; 
Carson, 2007). NPD collaboration contexts are characterized by the nature of the joint tasks (the 
task context) and the relationship among partners (the relational context) (Tatikonda and 
Rosenthal, 2000; Sobrero and Roberts, 2002; Walter, 2003).  
Regarding the joint task context, uncertainty caused by either complex products or novel 
technology creates a dilemma for a buying firm (Johnsen, 2009). The need to better manage task 
uncertainty drives supplier collaboration (Petersen, Handfield and Ragatz, 2003; Ettlie and 
Pavlou, 2006), but at the same time, relying on a supplier to complete uncertain tasks creates 
information asymmetry and leaves room for opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989; Melander, 2012).  
Regarding the relational context, the literature on buyer-supplier product exchange shows 
that collaborative relationships are less exposed to supplier opportunism than an arm’s length 
relationship (Jean, Kim and Sinkovics, 2012). Collaborative relationships are indicated by high 
levels of inter-firm coordination efforts and mutual relationship-specific investment (Parkhe, 
1993; Jap, 1999). It is unclear whether the effectiveness of a collaborative relational context in 
curbing opportunism also exists in an intangible, less specified, and behaviorally non-transparent 
transaction like a buyer-supplier NPD project (Mayer, 2006). Research suggests relationship-
specific investments might unintentionally hurt collaboration outcomes in knowledge-intensive 
transactions due to greater safeguarding costs (Wagner, 2012). By locking both parties into a 
relationship, such investments can create unnecessary obligations and restrict information flows; 
thereby deterring inter-firm knowledge acquisition, creating collective blindness, and, ultimately, 
increasing the risk of opportunistic exploitation (Villena, Revilla and Choi, 2011; Zhou, in 
press). As such, we examine if task antecedents, specifically, product complexity and 
technological uncertainty, and relational antecedents, namely, inter-firm coordination efforts and 
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mutual relationship-specific investment affect the buying firm’s exposure to supplier 
opportunism.  
The effect of collaboration context on opportunism and the consequences of opportunism 
may vary due to differences in cultural and institutional contexts among countries (Chen, Peng 
and Saparito, 2002; Dickson, Weaver and Hoy, 2006). A country’s culture refers to the shared 
values and norms that influence beliefs and behavior in a society (Hofstede, 1980). A country’s 
institutional practices relate to the political, economic, and contractual behavior patterns that 
regulate societal interactions (Busenitz, Gómez and Spencer, 2000). In a buyer-supplier NPD 
project, cultural values and institutional practices influence how a buying firm and a supplier 
form expectations, set goals, evaluate risks, and perceive behaviors. Each of these affects the 
emergence and consequence of supplier opportunism in collaboration contexts (Brown Johnson 
and Droege, 2004; Dickson et al., 2006; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very, 2007). The literature 
shows that the influence of transaction context on firm behavior is culturally and institutionally 
contingent (Chen et al., 2002; Miranda and Kim, 2006).  
We choose two countries to test the moderation effect of national context: U.S. and 
China. These two countries are relevant for the purpose of this study for two reasons. First, they 
play important roles in emerging global product development initiatives (McDonough, Kahnb 
and Barczaka, 2001). According to a study by the Battelle Memorial Institute, the U.S. and China 
have the highest research and development spending in the world (Osawa and Mozur, 2014). 
Second, they have very distinct cultural and institutional environments. We specifically focus on 
the three cultural dimensions where the two countries differ most: individualism, long term 
orientation, and power distance (Hofstede, 1991), as well as one distinguishing institutional 
dimension: formalization (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Xie, Song and Stringfellow, 1998). In so doing, 
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we not only develop more generalizable results than are available from a single-country study, 
but we also provide useful knowledge for managers operating in global supply chains. This study 
also answers a call from the decision science literature to examine how China’s unique cultural 
and institutional environments influence buyer-supplier collaboration (Zhao, Flynn and Roth, 
2006).  
The volatile, ambiguous, and knowledge-intensive nature of a NPD project makes it 
especially exposed to opportunistic behavior (Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Carson, 2007). A 
buying firm may involve a supplier in a NPD project while unaware of the inherent 
complications created by the collaboration context. In order to appropriately allocate limited 
managerial resources among NPD collaborative instances, a buying firm needs to understand 
which contexts have higher risks of supplier opportunism. Therefore, in this study we examine 
three research questions:  
(i) Does the task context indicated by product complexity and technological novelty, and the 
relational context indicated by coordination efforts and mutual relationship-specific investments, 
affect supplier opportunism in joint NPD projects?  
(ii) Does supplier opportunism affect design quality and efficiency?  
(iii) Do the results of (i) and (ii) differ in countries with different cultural and institutional 
environments, i.e., China versus U.S.?  
To answer these questions, we adopt two complementary and dominant perspectives for 
studying opportunism: agency theory and transaction costs theory (TCT) (Bergen, Dutta and 
Walker Jr, 1992; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Both theories treat opportunism as being evoked 
by certain antecedents (Bergen et al., 1992; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Wang, Li, Ross Jr and 
Craighead, 2013). The two theories, though different, complement each other in explaining 
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antecedents of opportunism in inter-organizational collaboration. Adopting more than one 
theoretical perspective, which has benefited the decision science literature, allows us to 
comprehensively understand the phenomenon  and enhance our theoretical rigor (Saeed, 
Malhotra and Grover, 2011). This study also represents a first attempt to test the predictive 
validity of the two theories on opportunism in a knowledge intensive context.  
The unit of analysis is a buyer-supplier NPD instance involving one buying firm and one 
supplying firm working together to develop a physical product. We collected a survey sample of 
214 U.S. and 212 Chinese buyer-supplier NPD projects. The U.S. (China) NPD projects were 
conducted in the U.S. (China), and the majority of buying firm and supplier members are 
American (Chinese).  We use two-group structural equation modeling to test country differences.  
Our results contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we extend the literature 
on opportunism from traditional product exchange settings to a more tacit and uncertain 
knowledge exchange context. Second, we show which task and relational contexts are more 
exposed to risks of supplier opportunism, which helps firms better govern NPD projects to 
minimize transaction cost. Third, answering a call from the supplier NPD involvement literature, 
our findings help the field understand how ongoing buyer-supplier relationships affect supplier 
involvement projects (van Echtelt et al., 2008; Johnsen, 2009). Fourth, this study reveals 
country-contextual differences that will aid multi-national corporations in adapting NPD 
practices in different countries (Johnsen, 2009; Perks, Kahn and Zhang, 2009). In shifting 
attention away from selecting suppliers with certain traits, and instead focusing on the design of 
the collaboration context, our research shows that supplier opportunism is inherent in certain 
NPD project contexts, and that supplier opportunism can explain unsatisfactory NPD project 
performance.  
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OPPORTUNISM IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL JOINT INNOVATION  
The decision to collaborate with external organizations in innovation is the result of an economic 
(or cost-benefit) calculus. When engaging in collaborative product development, a firm’s 
innovation performance benefits from external knowledge spillovers (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). At the same time, the firm needs to safeguard its research and 
development (R&D) investments against partners’ opportunistic behavior, such as free-riding 
(Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995; Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999) and leakage of valuable 
technology (Teece, 1986; Pisano, 1990; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Mol, 2005). In joint 
innovation, partner opportunism increases the risk of failing to obtain a fair share of the 
innovation return and the risk of turning the partner into a competitor by unplanned, one-sided 
knowledge flows. Such perceived exchange risks, in turn, motivate the firm to behave 
opportunistically in order to protect its benefits (Helm and Kloyer, 2004). When the benefits of 
acquiring knowledge outweigh the cost of safeguarding against opportunism, a firm is more 
likely to involve external organizations in its innovation process (Brockhoff, 1992; Veugelers, 
1998).   
The collaborative innovation literature has examined both proactive and reactive 
governance mechanisms that could be used to prevent opportunism while minimizing creativity 
degradation (Stump and Heide, 1996; Ulset, 1996). Proactively, firms could qualify partner 
trustworthiness and capability (Li, Eden, Hitt and Ireland, 2008), draft formal contracts, rely on 
relational mechanisms (e.g., reputation, continuity, and trust), and limit collaboration scope 
(Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Reactively, a firm could intensify ex post monitoring to reduce 
information asymmetry on partners’ behavior. No matter what governance mechanism is used, 
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the relational and task context influences governance effectiveness in securing collaborative 
benefits (Carson, Madhok, Varman and John, 2003; Helm and Kloyer, 2004; Sampson, 2004a; 
Carson et al., 2006; Carson, 2007).  
The inter-organizational opportunism literature has extensively examined antecedents of 
opportunism in inter-organizational channels (Hawkins, Wittmann and Beyerlein, 2008). Factors, 
such as inter-organizational structures (John, 1984), dependence (Joshi and Arnold, 1997), 
relational norms (Joshi and Stump, 1999), formalization (Provan and Skinner, 1989), and 
uncertainty (Schilling and Steensma, 2002), have been shown to predict opportunism in inter-
organizational transactions Each of these studies alludes to the importance of examining how a 
transaction context influences opportunism. As John points out, it is important to understand if 
contextual variables might predict opportunistic behavior in situations where such behavior is 
feasible. Most studies only use opportunism to conceptually explain how the transaction context 
predicts governance mechanism and collaboration outcomes (Brockhoff, 1992; Ulset, 1996; 
McCutchen Jr, Swamidass and Teng, 2004; Sampson, 2004b; 2007; Li et al., 2008). The few that 
examine the context-opportunism link focus more on the relational characteristics than on the 
task characteristics of the transaction context. For instance, power and relational tenure have 
been shown to influence partner opportunism in joint R&D (John, 1984; Deeds and Hill, 1999). 
However, it is less well known how task characteristics, such as novelty and complexity, 
influence partner opportunism. Furthermore, although cultural and institutional factors directly 
influence opportunism (Johnson, Cullen and Sakano, 1996; Lee, 1998; Skarmeas, Katsikeas and 
Schlegelmilch, 2002), it is less known how such factors moderate the impact of the transaction 
context on opportunism. To address these gaps, we adopt agency theory and TCT to explain (1) 
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how the relational and task characteristics influence supplier opportunism, and (2) how these 
influences are moderated by cultural and institutional differences between countries.  
 
AGENCY AND GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN BUYER-SUPPLIER NPD  
Agency theory views agent opportunism as an outcome of principal-agent information 
asymmetry and goal conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kim and Mahoney, 2005). It has been used to 
study many types of buyer-supplier interactions where information asymmetry, opportunism, and 
bounded rationality exist (Bergen et al., 1992; Mishra, Heide and Cort, 1998; Sirdeshmukh, 
Singh and Sabol, 2002). The domain of agency theory is any relationship between “a principal 
and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior but have differing goals and differing 
attitudes toward risk” (Eisenhardt, 1989, pg. 59). The principal delegates decisions and/or work 
to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to the theory, incomplete information on 
agents’ behaviors and task outcomes reduce the principal’s ability to assess and correct agent 
behavior (i.e., increase information asymmetry), thus increasing agent opportunism (Wallace, 
Johnson and Umesh, 2009). Further, agency theory assumes partial principal-agent goal conflicts 
(Ross, 1973; Holmstrom, 1982). A principal and agent usually differ in risk preferences and task 
responsibilities, causing them to form different, and often conflicting goals in order to serve their 
self-interests (Bergen et al., 1992; Wang and Webster, 2007).  
By contrast, TCT focuses on the choice of governance mechanism to minimize the 
transaction costs that are caused by agent opportunism (Walker and Poppo, 1991; Kim and 
Mahoney, 2005). Opportunism is viewed as the result of selecting the wrong governance 
mechanism that fails to align with exchange attributes. In essence, TCT claims that there is a 
relative economic efficiency of selecting hierarchy-based governance (i.e., vertical integration) 
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over market-based governance (i.e., arms-length) for transactions that are more uncertain. Inter-
organizational collaboration is a hybrid form of governance that relies on neither hierarchy nor 
market to coordinate transactions (Ménard, 2004). Inter-organizational collaboration allows 
firms to access complementary external resources to achieve goals unattainable by any individual 
firm. However, for collaborations with consequential uncertainty, hybrid governance is less 
efficient than hierarchical governance in terms of safeguarding transaction-specific assets, 
evaluating partner performance, and adapting to emerging situations (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997; Ménard, 2004). The consequence of the misalignment between a hybrid governance 
structure and an uncertain exchange context is a lack of control on opportunism, which causes 
higher transaction cost.  
Therefore, in the context of buyer-supplier joint NPD projects, both agency theory and 
TCT predict that task and relational characteristics should influence supplier opportunism. 
According to agency theory, the buying firm delegates portions of the development task to a 
supplier. Therefore, agency theory views the buying firm as a principal and the supplier as an 
agent. Supplier opportunism is then caused by buyer-supplier (or principal-agent) information 
asymmetry and goal conflicts, both of which vary according to the task and relational factors. 
TCT views buyer-supplier NPD collaboration as a hybrid governance mechanism. Compared to 
a hierarchy (i.e. no supplier involvement in the NPD project), buyer-supplier NPD collaboration 
aligns better with a more certain transactional context. According to TCT, supplier opportunism, 
an indicator of governance-context misalignment, is higher in more uncertain task and relational 
contexts.  
A joint NPD of car seats between Ford Motor Company and Lear Corporation for the 1996 
Ford Taurus is illustrative (Walton, 1997). An uncertain task context existed because of the 
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complexity of the Taurus seat and the novelty of the technologies (Guillermin, 2006). Ford found 
it difficult to rely on formal mechanisms to govern Lear’s project activities. A short relational 
tenure further inhibited Ford-Lear communication and demotivated Lear commitment, both of 
which created room for Lear opportunism. For instance, only after numerous design defects were 
found during prototyping and manufacturing did Ford realize that Lear had hid information about 
their own severe shortage of engineering talent. Moreover, Lear’s relaxed cultural style and 
reluctance to share designs were perceived by Ford as low commitment, which led Ford to 
increase its direct involvement in the project and require Lear to reorganize the Taurus team. The 
result was significantly higher cost for both firms (Wathne and Heide, 2000). This illustrates how 
task and relational contexts of a joint NPD project influence supplier opportunism that then 
affect collaboration outcomes.  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Antecedents of Supplier Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier NPD 
The task environment of buyer-supplier NPD projects varies in levels of uncertainty, a key 
transaction attribute in both the agency and transaction cost literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Ménard, 2004). In order to examine whether supplier opportunism 
is more of a problem in a more uncertain task environment, we focus on two primary factors that 
influence task uncertainty: product complexity and technological novelty as perceived by project 
members at the beginning of the project (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). Complex products 
have a large number of components that share many design interfaces with each other and 
require highly differentiated expertise for development (Flynn and Flynn, 1999). High product 
complexity causes equivocality, the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations about 
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task situations (Koufteros, Vonderembse and Doll, 2002). Thus, NPD projects developing 
complex products are usually associated with highly variable performance (Cohen, Eliashberg 
and Ho, 1996). Technological novelty also makes project outcomes less predictable (Tatikonda 
and Montoya-Weiss, 2001). With new technologies there is a lack of knowledge about the best 
way to solve technological problems and the exact means of implementation. This lack of 
knowledge makes the results of various decisions more difficult to predict. Furthermore, projects 
employing novel technologies often require more “organic” project structures and “experiential” 
approaches, which are less predictable (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). Finally, the desirability 
and reliability of newer technologies have not been tested in the marketplace, which decreases 
the ability to predict market size and product profitability (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Such 
demand uncertainty means it is more challenging for both the buying firm and the supplier to 
predict financial returns from the collaboration, thus increasing outcome uncertainty for both 
parties.  
According to agency theory, product complexity and technological novelty, through 
increasing project outcome uncertainty, should lead to a higher level of supplier opportunism. An 
uncertain task environment makes it more difficult to align goals and validate supplier behavior 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). When developing complex products or adopting novel technology, both the 
buying firm and the supplier have limited information for forming their respective task strategies. 
This lack of information increases the chance of goal conflicts at the project outset. In addition, 
congruent goals set at the beginning of the project could become conflicting in later stages due to 
changes made by each group to adapt to the uncertain task environment. Goal conflicts between 
the buying firm and the supplier increase the chance that the buying firm judges the supplier as 
shirking responsibilities, window-dressing efforts, and making hollow promises (Das and Teng, 
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1996). Furthermore, an uncertain task environment makes it difficult to detect supplier 
opportunism in the R&D process due to the existence of multiple explanations for the same 
behavior. When projects fail, it is difficult to disentangle non-compliance of partners from 
external sources of failure due to information asymmetry (Veugelers, 1998). Altogether, agency 
theory predicts that a more uncertain task environment, caused by high product complexity or 
technological novelty, is more exposed to supplier opportunism.  
According to TCT, environmental uncertainty reduces the fit of hybrid governance 
mechanisms, such as inter-organizational collaboration, with the transaction context. In a NPD 
project, product complexity and technological novelty increase environmental uncertainty – i.e., 
the “unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier, John and 
Nevin, 1990, pg. 82). As a result, the buying firm is less capable of specifying appropriate 
behavior and expectations before the collaboration starts, which makes it difficult to detect 
opportunistic behavior (Carson et al., 2006). In addition, to avoid limiting supplier creativity, 
which is critical for the success of a NPD task, the buying firm often has to scale back 
monitoring supplier behavior after the collaboration starts, which further creates room for 
supplier opportunism (Carson, 2007). Such a lack of ex ante specification and ex post monitoring 
will be more of a problem when the task is completed by joint efforts of two firms (e.g., inter-
organizational collaboration), rather than by the efforts of a single firm (e.g., hierarchies). 
According to TCT, hierarchy is a better governance choice than a hybrid governance structure 
for uncertain transactions due to its higher efficiency in managing safeguards, adaptations, and 
problem evaluations (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Thus, for a project involving complex 
products or novel technologies, collaborating with an external supplier is a worse governance 
choice than keeping the project in-house. TCT proposes that a major consequence of this 
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governance-transaction misalignment is a high transaction cost as indicated by supplier 
opportunism (Sampson, 2004a). Consequently, both agency theory and TCT lead us to 
hypothesize that:  
H1: (a) Product complexity and (b) technological novelty increase supplier opportunism in a 
buyer-supplier NPD project.  
 
While the above task contextual factors of a NPD project increase supplier opportunism, 
two buyer-supplier relational attributes – coordination efforts and mutual relationship-specific 
investments – help reduce supplier opportunism (Jap, 1999). Developing and maintaining a 
cooperative relationship requires experience in joint coordination efforts and investing in 
relation-specific assets (Jap, 1999). Coordination efforts, in the form of joint projects tailored to 
buying and supplying firms’ needs, enable partners to share information and processes in such a 
way as to capitalize on existing synergies and opportunities (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Mutual 
relationship-specific investments are resources dedicated to the relationship by both buying and 
supplying firms, such as dedicated equipment, co-located facilities, partner-specific knowledge, 
etc. For example, customers of the Swedish firm Tetra Pak often invest in filling equipment that 
is best fed with packaging material obtained from Tetra Pak (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001). 
Because such investments lose value if the relationship breaks, continued exchange is expected 
(Heide and John, 1990), opportunistic behaviors are minimized (Nair, Narasimhan and Bendoly, 
2011), and collaboration efficiencies are promised (Williamson, 1993).  
From an agency theory perspective, past coordination efforts and mutual relational 
investment reduce supplier opportunism through lowering information asymmetry and aligning 
goals. With respect to coordination efforts, it allows the accumulation of partner-specific 
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collaboration experience, which reduces information asymmetry in future collaboration (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005). Specifically, recurrent collaborations allow a buying firm to gain more 
knowledge about the routines, assumptions, and values of a supplier, which enables accurate 
prediction and evaluation of supplier behavior for future projects (Jap and Anderson, 2003). 
Moreover, extensive information about the supplier reduces the likelihood that the buying firm 
will form unrealistic expectations about supplier’s behavior, reducing the likelihood that the 
supplier will be misjudged as opportunistic. In addition, extensive coordination efforts with a 
supplier might also enhance the buying firm’s general collaboration capability (Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2005). Such enhanced collaboration capability is associated with better ex ante goal 
alignment and ex post monitoring, both of which demotivate supplier opportunism. Coordination 
efforts contribute to goal alignment by building a shared expectation of a long-term relationship 
(Dyer, 1997) that further reduces supplier opportunism (Parkhe, 1993). With respect to mutual 
relationship-specific investments (Jap and Anderson, 2003), the non-transferable nature of such 
investments signals a shared understanding of open-ended future interactions and a high 
frequency of inter-firm contact (Williamson, 1985). Both firms understand that they will have 
more to lose once their opportunistic behaviors are detected. Thus, supplier opportunism is 
directly demotivated by the higher cost of opportunism and by the belief that a buying firm will 
not behave opportunistically (Heide and Miner, 1992). In addition, training to understand partner 
routines, building inter-firm information systems, and co-locating people with similar 
responsibilities, builds a common language and creates communication routines. These actions 
reduce buyer-supplier information asymmetry and ultimately demotivate supplier opportunism 
(Ragatz, Handfield and Scannell, 1997).  
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According to TCT, a collaborative relational context curbs supplier opportunism by 
enhancing the efficiency of a hybrid governance (e.g., inter-organizational collaboration) (Li et 
al., 2008). Because R&D transactions are volatile, ambiguous, and knowledge-intensive by 
nature, they are highly exposed to risks of opportunism (Carson et al., 2006; Carson, 2007). To 
enhance the governing efficiency of inter-organizational R&D transactions, TCT proposes that a 
collaborative inter-firm relationship helps by reducing the uncertainty in the exchange context 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Because of mutual investment in relationship-specific assets, 
common in a collaborative relationship, the intellectual assets of either party are less exposed to 
unethical exploitation (Carson et al., 2003). Collaboration experience accumulated in a 
relationship eases adaptation to environmental change and evaluation of partner behavior 
(Lumineau and Henderson, 2012). Altogether, there is less room for opportunism. Following this 
TCT logic, coordination efforts and mutual relationship-specific investments, two indicators of a 
collaborative relational context, improve the governance-transaction fit, which should be 
reflected by a lower level of supplier opportunism. Following the above agency and TCT 
perspectives, we hypothesize:  
H2: Buyer-supplier (a) coordination effort and (b) mutual relationship-specific investment 
decrease supplier opportunism in a buyer-supplier NPD project.  
 
Consequences of Supplier Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier NPD 
The presence of supplier opportunism has damaging effects on two types of project 
performance: design quality and efficiency. Design quality is the degree to which the product 
design meets performance goals related to its fitness for use (Swink and Calantone, 2004). 
Design efficiency is the extent to which resources are fully utilized on productive design 
Page 16 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
17 
 
activities so development cost and cycle time goals are met (Hoegl and Gemuenden, 2001). 
These two aspects of NPD performance capture both the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
joint NPD process (Wheelwright, 1992); both are important performance indicators of NPD 
projects (Olson, Walker Jr and Ruekert, 1995; Swink and Mabert, 2000; Hoegl and 
Gemuenden, 2001; Takeishi, 2001; Bstieler, 2005). Given the possible trade-off between 
effectiveness and efficiency in NPD projects, it is important to examine how supplier 
opportunism influences both design quality and efficiency (Sobrero and Roberts, 2001).  
Supplier opportunism reduces design quality resulting from both the supplier’s self-
interest-seeking behaviors and the buying firm’s safeguarding responses. First, fraudulent, 
deceitful, and local-optimizing supplier behaviors jeopardize design quality by limiting the 
quality and quantity of knowledge contributed to the joint innovation task (Das and Rahman, 
2010). Second, supplier opportunism motivates a buying firm to safeguard knowledge assets due 
to the higher risk of exposing them to supplier exploitation. Such safeguarding responses include 
withholding information, reducing resource commitment, limiting investment, and intensifying 
monitoring (Andrews and Delahaye, 2000). These safeguarding activities reduce the quantity and 
quality of the knowledge transferred and co-created, thus hurting design quality. Lastly, supplier 
opportunism will foster a sense of supplier untrustworthiness and in turn demotivate the buying 
firm from actively acquiring and absorbing knowledge shared by a supplier, resulting in fewer 
opportunities to improve designs (Levin and Cross, 2004). 
Supplier opportunism also reduces the efficiency of the design process by making the buyer-
supplier NPD costly and slow. Supplier actions, such as distorting information, delaying 
response, and shirking obligations, reduce the speed of exchanging information and creating 
knowledge (Clemons and Hitt, 2004). In addition, such behaviors escalate buyer-supplier 
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conflicts, reducing process efficiency by diverting project resources away from productive 
design work (Luo, 2007). An opportunistic supplier is more likely to increase its level of formal 
control when sharing knowledge with the buying firm by prioritizing its own short-term gains 
and losses over project progress, thus reducing process efficiency (Das and Teng, 1998). Buying 
firm safeguarding responses, such as intensely questioning supplier-provided information and 
increasing verification requirements (Das and Teng, 1998), reduce the speed of information 
exchange and increase the resource consumption (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). Thus we 
hypothesize:    
H3: Supplier opportunism in a buyer-supplier NPD project decreases (a) design quality and 
(b) design efficiency. 
 
Differences between China and the United States  
Cultural and institutional factors should influence how the effects we hypothesize above differ 
between the U.S. and China. Culturally, the three Hofstede dimensions where the U.S. and China 
differ most are: individualism (score: China: 20; U.S.: 91), power distance (score: China, 80; 
U.S., 40), and long-term orientation (China: 118; U.S.: 29). Individualism refers to the degree of 
interdependence a society maintains among its members. Power distance refers to the extent to 
which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally. Long-term orientation refers to the extent in which a 
society shows a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historical short-
term point of view (Hofstede, 1991). Institutionally, China distinguishes itself most from the 
U.S. on the extent of reliance on informal, rather than formal, institutions to govern business 
transactions (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Park and Luo, 2001; Cai, Jun and Yang, 2010; Li, Xie, Teo 
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and Peng, 2010b). Because cultural and institutional factors affect how firms perceive and 
respond to tasks and relationships, we use country differences in these factors to explain how the 
main effects hypothesized above vary between China and the U.S. (Brown Johnson and Droege, 
2004; Dickson et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2007).   
Our first set of moderation hypotheses is that the two task antecedents, product complexity 
and technological novelty, influence supplier opportunism less in China than in the U.S. This 
difference exists primarily because transaction uncertainty and goal conflict will be less of a 
concern in China than in the U.S. Culturally, China’s long-term orientation will reduce supplier 
sensitivity to short-term project outcome concerns (Gelfand, Spurlock, Sniezek and Shao, 2000). 
In placing higher value on the long-term potential benefits of collaboration, a Chinese supplier 
will be more willing than a U.S. supplier to align with the buying firm’s expectations to invest in 
uncertain project activities and adopt risky strategies (Nakata and Sivakumar, 1996). In addition, 
China’s collectivistic culture will help align buying firm and supplier interests, motivating 
suppliers to prioritize project targets over their own goals (Song and Montoya-Weiss, 2001). 
China’s power distant culture causes suppliers to accept the buying firm’s power in specifying 
goals and authorizing strategies, thus minimizing buyer-supplier transactional uncertainties and 
goal conflicts (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005).  
Institutionally, China’s reliance on informal norms, shared values, reciprocal favors, and 
shared responsibility enhances the supplier’s intrinsic motivation to align its goals with the 
buying firm’s (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). In China, the reliance on interpersonal 
relationships to govern transactions (Perks et al., 2009) increases the informational content 
within the buyer-supplier NPD, enhancing the clarity of behavioral expectation ex ante and 
facilitating monitoring of behavior ex post. Altogether, the cultural and institutional 
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characteristics of the Chinese context reduce buyer-supplier goal conflicts and information 
asymmetry when facing uncertain knowledge transaction outcomes. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H4: The effect size of (a) product complexity and (b) technological novelty on supplier 
opportunism are smaller in Chinese firms than in U.S. firms. 
 
Our second set of moderation hypotheses is that the benefits of coordination efforts and 
mutual relationship-specific investments in curbing supplier opportunism will be less in China as 
compared to those in the U.S. The primary reason for this discrepancy is that informal processes 
that reduce opportunism are inherent in China’s cultural and institutional environments. 
Culturally, China’s long-term orientation diverts supplier attention from short-term benefits 
gained through opportunism to long-term benefits resulting from a partnership. Also, China is 
imbued with collectivistic values that align a firm’s goals by rewarding harmony and cooperation 
(Tjosvold, Law and Sun, 2003). The acceptance of power distance demotivates Chinese suppliers 
from subverting the goals of a buying firm. Because both coordination efforts and mutual 
relationship-specific investments aim to align goals, these factors will be less influential in 
curbing supplier opportunism in China than in the U.S. since goal alignment is less in question 
(Chen et al., 2002). 
Institutional factors should create a similar effect. Chinese often rely on informal institutions 
to govern inter-firm transactions. For instance, interpersonal relationships and social control 
mechanisms influence how a buying firm selects suppliers and govern supplier behavior (Li et 
al., 2010b). Information and knowledge embedded in interpersonal relationships (i.e., the Guan 
Xi network) help reduce buyer-supplier transaction uncertainty and information asymmetry (Cai 
et al., 2010). Informal control mechanisms, such as trust, encourage both a buying firms and a 
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supplier to openly identify, examine, and resolve problems (Luo, Liu, Zhang and Huang, 2011). 
Altogether, China’s cultural and institutional environment makes buyer-supplier goal conflict 
and information asymmetry less of a concern in buyer-supplier NPD projects. As a result, having 
past coordination efforts and mutual relationship-specific investment are less important to curb 
supplier opportunism. Given these factors, we propose:  
H5: The effect size of (a) previous coordination efforts and (b) mutual relationship-specific 
investments on supplier opportunism are smaller in Chinese firms than in U.S. firms.  
 
Our third set of moderation hypotheses relates to how Chinese and U.S. cultural and 
institutional factors create more buying firm vulnerability, which affects the impact of supplier 
opportunism on project performance. Collectivist and power-distant cultures, like China, accept 
more interdependence in relations and view reliance on others as inevitable (Hofstede, 1991). 
For instance, Chinese buying firms might ask for supplier advice and resources in more project 
activities than buying firms in the U.S. would request. As a result, if suppliers delay their 
responses, the harm is greater in China than in the U.S. China’s long-term cultural orientation 
means there is a bias to assume buyer-supplier NPD relationship will last over time, which 
suggests fewer back-up plans and alternatives available if problems arise. When an opportunistic 
supplier deteriorates the NPD process under such circumstances, contingency plans won’t be 
readily available and corrective action will be difficult.  
In contrast, U.S. buying firms believe in individual empowerment and independence. This 
short-term orientation means a buying firm in the U.S. is less likely to view a supplier as an 
integral, long-term partner for NPD projects. This perspective reduces the influence that supplier 
behavior has on project performance. Institutionally, the lack of well-developed formal 
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institutions, such as contractual laws, exposes Chinese buying firms to a greater extent to 
supplier exploitation than U.S. buyers. Due to a lack of formal controls in China, Chinese project 
success is reliant on the supplier’s voluntary cooperative behaviors. Without well-developed 
formal governance mechanisms, a high dependence on the supplier increases the damaging 
effects of supplier opportunism on project performance.   
Furthermore, Chinese rely on informal behavioral norms in governing business exchanges, 
such as reciprocity in exchanging favors and fulfilling obligations (Mu et al., 2007). However, 
this shared value of recipr city makes the buyer-supplier NPD vulnerable to a conflict spiral 
(Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp, 1998). That is, Chinese buying firms may react punitively to 
supplier exploitation, aggravating the impact of supplier opportunism on project performance. In 
contrast, U.S. buying firm reliance on formal governance mechanisms reduces project 
vulnerability to supplier opportunism and demotivates a buying firm to initiate reciprocal 
punishment. Accordingly, U.S. cultural and institutional contexts reduce the damage of supplier 
opportunism on project performance. We hypothesize:  
H6: The effect size of supplier opportunism on (a) design quality and (b) design efficiency 
are greater in Chinese firms than in U.S. firms.  
< INSERT FIGURE 1 > 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
We tested the hypotheses using survey responses from manufacturing (buying) firms involved in 
426 buyer-supplier NPD projects in the U.S. and China. The projects include sixteen industries 
producing complex and discrete products, such as airplanes, automobiles, ships, computers, 
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mobile phones, and medical equipment. To control for single-respondent bias, we asked two 
project members from each buying firm to respond to different parts of the survey. The first 
respondent was asked to consider a recent NPD instance (i.e., finished within the past three 
years) where an external supplier collaborated with its business unit around the design of a new 
product in Part I of the survey. The first respondent provided information on the project’s design 
quality and efficiency, the four antecedents to supplier opportunism, the firm size, and the timing 
of supplier involvement. The first respondent also provided the contact information of one key 
project member who actively participated in developing the product and interacted with the 
supplier during the collaboration. In Part II of the survey, this second respondent provided 
information about the interaction of each firm’s project members during the project, the 
perceived level of supplier opportunism, and useful control variables. In this way, we separated 
responses for independent and dependent variables, reducing the correlations between them 
caused by the single respondent effect. To ensure informed respondents, respondents indicated 
their level of knowledge in answering the survey and only those responses that indicated “above 
average” or “very knowledgeable” were kept. 
The initial set of respondents in the U.S. came from a commercial list provider of contact 
information of U.S. firm managers (n=2,045), among which were 2,000 email addresses and 45 
physical mail addresses. We extracted the initial set of respondents in China from member 
listings of manufacturer associations (n=580), all of which only provided physical mail 
addresses. To collect data, we used two methods: online surveys and hard-copy surveys. 
Managers were selected based on (i) job titles that indicated engineering, manufacturing, product 
development, project management, or purchasing responsibilities; and (ii) industries that 
manufactured physical and discrete products. Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com) hosted 
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a two-part online survey. We sent Part I of the survey to 2,000 contacts in the U.S. by email in 
2010, followed by two rounds of emails and two rounds of phone calls to non-respondents. We 
included project information provided by the project manager in Part I of the survey in Part II of 
the survey to ensure both referred to the same collaboration instance. We sent Part II of the 
survey by email, followed by two rounds of emails and two rounds of phone calls. First 
respondents specified the country of origin for project members from both firms, and we only 
kept responses where the majority of project members had the same nationality. This process 
resulted in 186 completed online U.S. surveys (Part I and II). In addition, we mailed Part I 
surveys to 45 managers in the U.S. and 580 to managers in China, followed by two rounds of 
hard-copy surveys and two rounds of phone calls, resulting in 28 and 212 completed surveys 
(Part I and II) from each country respectively. In total, we collected 426 out of 2,625 emailed and 
mailed surveys, with 214 from the U.S. and 212 from China, generating a response rate of 
16.23%. Demographics of the full dataset are included in the supplementary documentation. 
 
Variables and Operationalization   
The supplementary documentation shows construct measurements and literature references for 
all constructs used in this study. This table also presents each latent construct’s factor loading, t-
value, average variance extracted (AVE), construct reliability, and Cronbach’s Alpha. Each 
construct was measured using existing items validated by the literature.  
Following previous work (Jap and Anderson, 2003), we measured supplier opportunism 
using the buying firm’s perception. We took this approach because the buying firm “typically 
cannot verify their partners’ guile (Jap and Ganesan, 2000) and self-reports of opportunism by 
partners may understate their actual opportunistic behaviors (Crosno and Dahlstrom 2008; 
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Provan and Skinner 1989)” (Wang et al., 2013, pg. 112). We note that opportunistic supplier 
behavior from the buyer’s perspective might be considered rational behavior from the supplier’s 
perspective. For instance, while a supplier’s decision to assign fewer people to a joint project is a 
rational supplier response to resource constraints, a buyer could view such a decision as shirking 
if the supplier fails to communicate with the buyer. So when interpreting our findings, we 
replace “supplier opportunism” with “buyer perception of supplier opportunism” to be more 
accurate. In order to ensure that such buyer perception is not biased by the respondent’s 
demographic background, we tested the significance of the correlation between each of the two 
demographic variables: functional department (marketing, engineering, manufacturing, 
purchasing and others) and project role (project manager, design engineer, manufacturing 
engineer, and others), and buyer perception of supplier opportunism in each sample. All the four 
correlations turn out to be insignificant, which supports the validity of buyer perception of 
supplier opportunism.   
We also included a set of control variables that are tangential to our focus but that may 
affect supplier opportunism and project performance: trust, capability complementarity, buying 
firm size, supplier involvement timing, contract type, project size, and task relevant expertise. 
Trust is an important safeguarding mechanism and should influence not only how the buying 
firm interprets supplier behavior and how suppliers behave (Jap and Anderson, 2003), but also 
should be positively correlated with design quality and efficiency (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). 
Complementary capabilities curb opportunistic behaviors and influence task performance 
through producing a shared sense of mutual dependence (Ganesan, 1994). Firm size influences 
project management capabilities, collaboration competences, and innovation potentials, and so 
we controlled for the number of employees (log) and sales (log). Involving suppliers early in the 
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“fuzzy front end” of NPD projects has been found to enhance project outcomes (Wagner, 2012), 
so we also included late supplier involvement as a control variable. The type of contractual 
governance influences incentive alignment and opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1985; Williamson, 
1985), and there are three major types that decrease in levels of hierarchical control: joint 
ventures, minority equity, and contractual agreements (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Because only 10 
of the 426 NPD collaboration instances did not adopt contractual agreements (2 out of 212 in 
China and 8 out of 214 in the U.S.), we controlled the effect of contract type by removing the 10 
cases from the final analysis. Project size could also influence group interactions and, in turn, 
task performance (Amason and Sapienza, 1997), so we controlled for its effect on supplier 
opportunism and project performance. We also controlled for task-relevant expertise of engineers 
because it potentially influences knowledge-intensive interactions, behaviors, and task 
performance (Bunderson, 2003).  
We considered relational tenure as a possible factor that influences supplier opportunism. 
While a relationship with a long history does not necessarily mean it is collaborative in nature 
(McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; Villena et al., 2011), it has been shown to reflect the cooperative 
nature of a buyer-supplier relationship (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, what is essential to 
H2 is that the two relational antecedents, coordination efforts and relationship-specific 
investment, embody the level of cooperation in the relationship. Including relational tenure 
would not control for a confounding factor as much as it would create multi-collinearity 
problems (Graham, 2003). As such, we did not include relational tenure as a control variable. 
Descriptive statistics (such as mean, standard deviation, and correlations) of the 12 
constructs for the U.S. and China samples are shown in Table 1. All the items had skewness and 
kurtosis scores within acceptable ranges, and most were close to zero, indicating the 
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acceptability of the normal distribution assumption under the SEM program. From Table 1, we 
noted that the average level of supplier opportunism in China (1.94) is very close to that in the 
U.S. (1.91). This finding implies that, on average, similar levels of supplier opportunism could 
be observed in buyer-supplier NPD projects conducted in the two countries.  
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Data Validation  
Before testing the structural model in each sample, we used two-group structural equation 
modeling (SEM) to assess measurement invariance across samples collected through the mail 
and on-line channels (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999; Byrne, 2004). Three chi-square difference 
tests supported factor variance-invariance across the two samples (i.e., equivalence of factor 
structures, loadings, and variances), which was required to compare standardized regression 
coefficients across populations (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998).  
To test uni-dimensionality, we evaluated a CFA model with all 10 latent constructs 
(shown in the online supplement) in each country (Garver and Mentzer, 1999). Both samples 
showed the measurement model fits the data well. Specifically, in the China (U.S.) sample, the 
Chi-square statistic was 1542.48 (1308.71), with a degree of freedom of 981 (981). RMSEA was 
0.048 (0.036), which suggested a good fit of the model with the data. All other fit indexes, such 
as SRMR, NNFI, CFI, and IFI, also suggested that the measurement model fits both samples 
well.  
We assessed discriminant validity for 45 pairs of the 10 latent constructs using chi-square 
difference tests. In the first CFA model, the correlation among the constructs was free to vary. In 
the second, the correlation was fixed to a perfect correlation (1.0) (O'Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 
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1998; Garver and Mentzer, 1999). Significant chi-square difference tests suggested discriminant 
validity. Because a number of repeated tests were performed, we used a Bonferroni corrected p-
value of 0.1139 (Byrne, 1994; Kroes and Ghosh, 2010). All 45 pairs of chi-square difference 
tests were significant (p-value<0.001139), indicating discriminant validity.  
We conducted different types of reliability tests using traditional reliability measures, 
such as Cronbach’s Alpha, average variance extracted (AVE), and construct reliability (Garver 
and Mentzer, 1999) (see the online supplement for detailed results). All of the constructs were 
reliable according to their Cronbach’s Alpha scores; all are greater than 0.75 and most were 
greater than 0.80 (Garver and Mentzer, 1999). All of the constructs had SEM construct reliability 
scores higher than 0.88 and variance extraction scores higher than 0.62, which indicated 
acceptable reliability levels (Garver and Mentzer, 1999).  
We tested for the presence of non-response bias using two methods. First, we compared 
the first and last 30 survey responses on all of the items of the 10 latent constructs (Lambert and 
Harrington, 1990; Flint and Mentzer, 1997). Second, we compared a random sample of 100 
respondent firms to 100 non-respondents firms in the sampling pool by conducting t-tests on 
their number of employees and on their 2010 sales figures (Wagner and Kemmerling, 2010). We 
identified no significant differences in either analysis.  
We attempted to minimize common method bias ex ante by separating the respondents 
answering dependent variables from those evaluating independent variables (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, our two data collection methods, on-line and 
mail surveys, minimized the bias associated with a single collection method. To confirm that 
common method bias was not a significant threat to the validity of our results, we found the 
correlation matrix does not show highly correlated variables; the highest correlation being 0.68, 
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which is below the recommended threshold of 0.8 suggested  (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips, 1991). In 
addition, we adopted (Lindell and Whitney, 2001)’s approach to conduct tests on the correlation 
table and found that common method bias does not account for any statistically significant 
correlations between independent and dependent variables.  
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
RESULTS 
We performed structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 
8.80 to test our hypotheses. In order to capture the total, direct, and indirect effects of product 
complexity, technological novelty, coordination efforts, and mutual relationship-specific 
investments on supplier opportunism, we ran three types of two-group baseline models: direct, 
proposed, and full, as shown in Table 3 (Liu, Huang, Luo and Zhao, 2012). In the direct model, 
we tested only the direct links between the four supplier opportunism antecedents and project 
performance. As the “Direct Model” in Table 3 shows, in both countries, product complexity and 
technological novelty significantly reduce design quality and efficiency, while coordination 
efforts and mutual relationship-specific investment significantly increase design quality and 
efficiency. These results suggest that developing complex products, adopting novel technology, 
and involving firms lacking a collaborative relationship all contribute to worse project 
performance in both China and the U.S.  
Next, we tested the proposed model, where the four antecedents influence project 
performance through buyer perception of supplier opportunism. We tested hypotheses one 
through six by examining the significance of standardized structural regression coefficients in 
each group in this proposed model. As the column labeled “Proposed Model” in Table 3 
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indicates, H1(a) is fully supported in that the impact of product complexity on supplier 
opportunism is significantly positive in both samples (China’s β=0.11, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s 
β=0.17, p<0.05).. However, H1(b) is not supported because technological novelty’s impact on 
supplier opportunism is not significant in either sample. We find that H2(a) is strongly supported 
in that the negative impact of coordination efforts on supplier opportunism is significant in both 
samples (China’s β=-0.11, p< 0.05; and the U.S.’s β=-0.22, p<0.01). However, the results show 
that H2(b) is not supported in either sample. Surprisingly, the opposite effect is found in both 
samples: mutual relationship-specific investment is found to significantly increase the level of 
perceived supplier opportunism in both samples (China’s β=0.12, p< 0.05; and the U.S.’s 
β=0.22, p<0.01). H3(a) and H3(b) are fully supported in both samples. NPD projects with a 
higher level of supplier opportunism, perceived by the buying firm, are associated with worse 
product design quality (China’s β=-0.17, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=-0.17, p<0.05) and less 
efficient design processes (China’s β=-0.25, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=-0.22, p<0.05) in both 
countries. 
Finally, to test if supplier opportunism provides full mediation, we examined both the direct 
links between the four antecedents and project performance and the indirect links through 
supplier opportunism using a third model (see Table 3’s “Full Model”). In comparison to the 
“Direct Model”, the paths between the four supplier opportunism antecedents and project 
performance remain significant and do not change signs in both samples. Thus, following the 
literature (Liu et al., 2012), we conclude that supplier opportunism partially mediates the effects 
of product complexity, technological novelty, coordination efforts, and mutual relationship-
specific investment on design quality and efficiency in both China and the U.S.  
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In order to test H4, H5, and H6, we adopted the two-group structural equation modeling 
approach (Koufteros and Marcoulides, 2006).We tested these hypotheses by a series of chi-
square difference tests, each comparing a more constrained model. The path coefficient tested in 
the “Proposed Model” was constrained to be equal across the two samples with the non-
constrained “Proposed Model” shown in Table 3. A significant chi-square difference test 
suggested the tested path coefficients are statistically different across the two samples. Table 4 
shows results of six chi-square difference tests. Four out of the six tests, H4(a), H5(a), H5(b), 
and H6(b), are significant. Specifically, product complexity has a smaller effect size on supplier 
opportunism in China, supporting H4(a) (China’s β=0.11, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=0.17, 
p<0.05). Coordination effort is less effective in reducing supplier opportunism in the China 
sample, which supports H5(a) (China’s β=-0.11, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=-0.22, p<0.01). 
Although the effect size of mutual relationship-specific investment on supplier opportunism is 
smaller in China and is consistent with H5(b), because mutual relationship-specific investment 
has a positive effect on supplier opportunism in both countries, H5(b) is not supported (China’s 
β=0.12, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=0.22, p<0.01). Finally, supplier opportunism is more harmful 
for design efficiency in China, supporting H6(b) (China’s β=-0.25, p<0.05 and the U.S.’s β=-
0.22, p<0.05). Two insignificant chi-square difference tests show that the effect of technological 
novelty on supplier opportunism and the effect of supplier opportunism on design quality do not 
vary across countries, giving lack of support for H4(b) and H6(a), respectively.  
To further test whether the task context increases the model’s explanatory power about 
supplier opportunism beyond what is predicted by the relational context, we conducted a post-
hoc two-step procedural test. For both the proposed and full models in Table 3, we built a 
constrained model (Model 1) that set the path coefficients of the two task contextual variables – 
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product complexity and technological novelty – to zero (Model 0). Then we conducted a chi-
square difference test between Model 0 and 1. The significant chi-square statistic for the 
proposed model (χ2 (df) =11.05 (4), p-value =0.03) and the full model (χ2(df) =14.16 (4), p-
value=0.01)
 
suggested the two task antecedents significantly improve the fit to the data. In 
addition, after adding the two task antecedents the R-squares of supplier opportunism increased: 
in the China (U.S.) sample the proposed model increases from 0.47 to 0.51 (0.53 to 0.58) and in 
the full model from 0.52 to 0.56 (0.61 to 0.68).  
 
< INSERT TABLE 3, TABLE 4, AND FIGURE 2 HERE > 
 
DISCUSSION 
Adopting the perspectives of agency theory and TCT, this study examines antecedents and 
consequences of supplier opportunism in a buyer-supplier NPD project. By comparing buying 
firms’ survey responses regarding 206 U.S. and 210 Chinese buyer-supplier NPD projects, we 
find that supplier opportunism is more likely to be observed in projects involving complex 
products in both countries, especially in the U.S. Technological novelty does not contribute to 
supplier opportunism in either country. In addition, past buyer-supplier coordination helps 
reduce supplier opportunism in both countries, especially in the U.S. Surprisingly, buyer-supplier 
mutual relationship-specific investment increases supplier opportunism in both countries, but 
more so in the U.S. In both countries, we find that supplier opportunism reduces both design 
quality and design efficiency; however, design efficiency is reduced to a greater extent in China 
than in the U.S.  
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Contribution to Theory 
Contributing to the supplier NPD involvement literature, we adopt agency and TCT perspectives 
to theoretically explain how task and relational contexts of a buyer-supplier NPD project 
influence supplier opportunism. In particular, complex products, limited collaboration 
experience, and mutual relationship-specific investment contribute to supplier opportunism. By 
showing this relationship, we improve understanding of why supplier involvement is less 
effective in certain projects. While the majority of supplier NPD involvement literature focuses 
on how the collaboration is planned and executed by the buying firm (Hartley et al., 1997; 
Petersen, Handfield and Ragatz, 2005; Jayaram, 2008; Parker, Zsidisin and Ragatz, 2008), our 
study finds that the preexisting context of a project is also highly influential in affecting supplier 
behavior. By showing the significant impact of product complexity, a task contextual factor, on 
supplier opportunism, beyond the influences of the relational context, this study fills a gap in the 
opportunism literature that primarily focuses on relational factors (John, 1984; Deeds and Hill, 
1999). Our results underscore the importance of studying the task context in order to increase the 
field’s understanding of opportunism in inter-organizational collaborations. 
In this study, we show that agency theory and TCT fail to predict the insignificant 
influences of technological novelty on supplier opportunism in both countries. There are two 
possible reasons for this unexpected result. First, suppliers might be less risk averse in projects 
adopting novel technology. When agreeing to venture into a novel technology together with the 
buying firm, suppliers accept some uncertainty in exchange for opportunities enabled by the 
novelty (Wells, Campbell, Valacich and Featherman, 2010). Such suppliers might be more 
willing to invest in risky activities to improve design solutions, reducing supplier opportunism as 
observed by the buying firm. Adding to the literature that examines limitations of agency theory, 
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this finding challenges the assumption about different principal-agent risk preferences in a buyer-
supplier NPD project using novel technology. Second, in the eyes of supplier project members, 
technological novelty not only implies uncertain transactions, but also implies innovation 
opportunities. Using novel product and process technology potentially helps create higher-
quality designs using fewer resources, which counteracts the possible negative influences of 
technological novelty on project performance (Wells et al., 2010). Such co-existence of gains 
and losses makes technological uncertainty insignificant in affecting the transaction uncertainty 
that is perceived by suppliers, thus technological uncertainty ultimately fails to influence supplier 
opportunism.  
From the perspectives of agency theory and TCT, it is surprising to observe the positive 
effect of mutual relationship-specific investment on supplier opportunism. Bilateral investments 
dedicated to the relationship are usually believed to curb opportunism by aligning incentives (Jap 
and Anderson, 2003). This finding shows that such investments might unintentionally hurt 
collaboration outcomes in knowledge-intensive transactions (Villena et al., 2011). This finding 
could be explained in multiple ways. Mutual relationship-specific investments may generate a 
sense of security that creates room for opportunistic behaviors. For instance, co-locating buying 
firm and supplier employees may create too much familiarity, which reduces the two firms’ 
alertness to unexpected behavior. Excessive levels of relational security, coupled with challenges 
of objectively evaluating behaviors in buyer-supplier NPD, may lead both firms to reduce efforts 
of monitoring, vigilance, and safeguards, which allows room for opportunistic behaviors (Villena 
et al., 2011). In addition, suppliers may gain buying firm-specific knowledge due to the usage of 
mutual relationship-specific assets, such as inter-firm information systems, customized 
machines, closely-located plants, or cross-training. Such knowledge may motivate suppliers to 
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cheat buying firms due to their perception that buyers have a lower probability of detection in a 
knowledge exchange and co-production context. Also, highly dedicated investment from both 
parties could put more at stake in the collaboration and increases expectations of each other’s 
performance, which creates more opportunities for conflict and dissatisfaction in the relationship 
(Rajagopal and Rajagopal, 2009). Finally, high mutual relationship-specific investment might 
indicate a lack of trust because this type of investment is used to protect each firm’s interest in 
the buyer-supplier relationship (Rinehart, Eckert, Handfield, Page and Atkin, 2004). In short, the 
unexpected results related to technology novelty and mutual relationship-specific investment call 
for more academic attention to investigate the use of agency theory and TCT in a knowledge 
exchange and co-production context.  
Finally, this study contributes to both agency theory and TCT by considering the contingency 
role of national context on antecedents and consequence of agent opportunism. Our findings 
suggest that the influences of product complexity, mutual relationship-specific investments, and 
coordination experience vary in magnitude, but not in direction. Specifically, each effect is more 
salient in the U.S. than in China. The unexpected insignificant effects of technological novelty 
on supplier opportunism in both countries also show that not all buyer-supplier NPD contextual 
attributes’ effects on supplier behaviors are culturally and institutionally contingent. Altogether, 
these findings refine our knowledge about how cultural and institutional contexts influence the 
exposure of a buyer-supplier NPD project, with certain task and relational contexts, to supplier 
opportunism. In addition, popular discussions of partner opportunism in traditional business 
exchange contexts rarely differentiate varying collaboration outcomes when examining 
performance implications of opportunism (Lubatkin et al., 2007). By showing that supplier 
opportunism influences some collaboration outcomes differently in China than in the U.S., our 
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work calls for more studies to uncover the mediating mechanisms between partner opportunism 
and various collaboration outcomes. In this way, we could further refine our understanding of 
consequences of partner opportunism in inter-organizational collaboration. 
 
Managerial Insights 
This study reveals to managers the buyer-supplier NPD project characteristics that are especially 
likely to contribute to supplier opportunism. When developing complex products, a buying firm 
should expect and prepare for opportunism. Due to a greater uncertainty in outcomes, suppliers 
will find it more difficult to justify resources devoted to buyer-supplier NPD projects when 
products are complex, leading to slower supplier responsiveness and less buying firm confidence 
about supplier commitment. In such circumstances, buying firms should plan for supplier 
communication and education upon project initiation. Buying firms will need to examine what of 
their tacit product knowledge should be transferred to suppliers to reduce information asymmetry 
and to allow rational resource allocation decisions by suppliers (Li, Poppo and Zhou, 2010a). 
Relationally, our results will enhance the prudence of buying firms when working with suppliers 
in NPD projects. Beyond considering technical competencies and internal resources of suppliers, 
buying firms should also consider how to design the inter-firm communication channels to better 
manage information asymmetry. In addition, suppliers must be aware that when partners make 
mutual relationship-specific investments, this mutuality increases the stakes of the buyer-supplier 
NPD project, making buying firms highly concerned about supplier behavior. Suppliers may not 
be aware that their actions are under such scrutiny, so open communication is imperative to 
avoid inappropriate expectations and misinterpretation of behaviors. The negative association 
between prior buyer-supplier collaborations and supplier opportunism shows open 
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communication is already tacitly embedded in the relationship to some extent. However, 
managers can still benefit from having explicit communication regarding behavior-related 
expectations to help avoid activities that can be viewed as opportunism. With the knowledge 
gained from this study, managers can design buyer-supplier NPD project with mechanisms that 
are potentially exposed to supplier opportunism in order to preempt problems related to 
opportunism.   
Managers also must be aware that opportunism exists and damages project outcomes even in 
collaborative buyer-supplier projects. Many promises are made in buyer-supplier NPD, to give 
information, to provide feedback, to make deadlines, and to warn of problems. (Lawson, 
Petersen, Cousins and Handfield, 2009). Our results suggest that when suppliers are perceived as 
shirking promises, even if they actually are non-opportunistic, design efficiency and quality are 
damaged. This finding reveals to managers that rather than solely relying on choosing the right 
involvement strategy and selecting the right supplier prior to the collaboration, suppliers’ 
behaviors throughout the involvement also deserve scrutiny. In addition, we believe that rather 
than seeing supplier opportunism as revealing supplier problems, buying firms should see it as a 
reflection of problems in the buyer-supplier NPD process itself. Taking this perspective would 
direct managerial attention to the system rather than to the behavior, which helps correct the 
underlying problem rather than damage the knowledge exchange and co-production processes. 
Finally, managers must be aware that the country context of the project matters. Chinese 
suppliers are less likely to be judged as opportunistic as U.S. suppliers in uncertain buyer-
supplier NPD processes, yet Chinese suppliers are more influential than U.S. suppliers in 
damaging collaboration outcomes once they determine to behave opportunistically. This finding 
reveals differences that affect how managers should implement inter-firm NPD to better fit local 
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cultures and institutions. In China, the Guan Xi approach to business may create biases toward 
giving supplier personnel the benefit-of-the-doubt where it is not deserved (Cai et al., 2010). In 
the U.S., the lack of interpersonal ties may create the opposite situation, generating doubt when it 
is undeserved. Thus, Chinese managers should rely less on their subjective judgment and more 
on objective measures of supplier activities when observing supplier behavior in buyer-supplier 
NPD processes. On the contrary, U.S. managers should openly communicate with suppliers to 
avoid misunderstanding and creating unnecessary conflicts. Likewise, the greater damaging 
effect of supplier opportunism in China than in the U.S. suggests that Chinese managers should 
appropriately adjust supplier roles in the project once opportunism is detected. They should also 
minimize unproductive buying firm responses to supplier opportunism. As global business drives 
managers to develop products in foreign countries, becoming aware of the unique, country-
specific contexts that influence drivers and consequences of supplier opportunism in buyer-
supplier NPD projects will be increasingly useful. 
 
Limitations and Future Research  
Though we have examined antecedents and consequences of supplier opportunism as judged by 
the buying firm in a buyer-supplier NPD context, we have not studied buying firm opportunism 
as observed by suppliers. Considering only supplier opportunism from the buying firm’s 
perspective might seem natural from an agency theory perspective, which assumes the buying 
firm as the principal and the supplier as the agent. However, the unique nature of a buyer-
supplier NPD context suggests that the supplier could also perceive the buying firm as being 
opportunistic. A productive avenue for future studies would consider both buying firm and 
supplier opportunism in a buyer-supplier NPD context. Given the buying firm’s significant 
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interests in securing project success, it is possible that supplier opportunism is a trigger of buying 
firm opportunism, which further motivates supplier opportunism. There might be a reciprocal 
causal relationship between the two.  
In this study, we only consider how supplier opportunism influences NPD project 
performance. Although project success is an important objective, there are other types of 
collaboration outcomes that deserve attention. For instance, acquiring knowledge from suppliers 
for future projects is an important driver (Bstieler and Hemmert, 2010). Buying firms may also 
be motivated by a strategic need to strengthen the buyer-supplier relationships (Shin, Collier and 
Wilson, 2000). Understanding whether project members are satisfied with the collaboration and 
whether the two firms are more capable of working together in the future are also important 
collaboration outcomes that can be examined in future studies.  
A major aspect of this study examines the contingency roles of country. Although we have 
tried to select countries that play major roles in global NPD initiatives and that have unique, 
globally representative cultural and institutional contexts (Hofstede, 1991; Zhao et al., 2006), 
external validity of results from this study are still limited. While limiting the sample to two 
countries allows significant statistical power in testing relationships, to better understand country 
contingencies, future studies should sample a broader set of countries with distinct cultural and 
institutional settings. Such a sample would also avoid the need to use country as a proxy for 
cultural and institutional factors, which instead could be directly measured and whose 
contingency effects could be statistically tested. 
  
Page 39 of 53 Decision Sciences
For Review Only
40 
 
References 
Amason, A. C., & Sapienza, H. J. (1997). The Effects of Top Management Team Size and 
Interaction Norms on Cognitive and Affective Conflict. Journal of Management, 23(4), 
495-516. 
Anderson, J. C., & Narus, J. A. (1990). A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm 
Working Partnerships. The Journal of Marketing 54(1), 42-58. 
Anderson, P., & Tushman, M. L. (1990). Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: 
A Cyclical Model of Technological Change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4), 
604-633. 
Andrews, K. M., & Delahaye, B. L. (2000). Influences on Knowledge Processes in 
Organizational Learning: The Psychosocial Filter. Journal of Management Studies, 37(6), 
797-810. 
Arbuckle, J., & Wothke, W. (1999). Amos 4 User’s Reference Guide. Chicago: Smallwaters 
Corporation. 
Bagozzi, R. P., Yi, Y., & Phillips, L. W. (1991). Assessing Construct Validity in Organizational 
Research. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(3), 421-458. 
Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker Jr, O. C. (1992). Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review 
of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories. The Journal of 
Marketing, 56(3), 1-24. 
Brockhoff, K. (1992). R&D Cooperation between Firms—a Perceived Transaction Cost 
Perspective. Management Science, 38(4), 514-524. 
Brown Johnson, N., & Droege, S. (2004). Reflections on the Generalization of Agency Theory: 
Cross-Cultural Considerations. Human Resource Management Review, 14(3), 325-335. 
Bstieler, L. (2005). The Moderating Effect of Environmental Uncertainty on New Product 
Development and Time Efficiency*. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 22(3), 
267-284. 
Bstieler, L., & Hemmert, M. (2010). Increasing Learning and Time Efficiency in 
Interorganizational New Product Development Teams. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 27(4), 485-499. 
Bunderson, J. S. (2003). Recognizing and Utilizing Expertise in Work Groups: A Status 
Characteristics Perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(4), 557-591. 
Busenitz, L. W., Gómez, C., & Spencer, J. W. (2000). Country Institutional Profiles: Unlocking 
Entrepreneurial Phenomena. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(5), 994-1003. 
Byrne, B. M. (1994). Structural Equation Modeling with Eqs and Eqs/Windows: Basic Concepts, 
Applications, and Programming Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications  
Byrne, B. M. (2004). Testing for Multigroup Invariance Using Amos Graphics: A Road Less 
Traveled. Structural Equation Modeling, 11(2), 272-300. 
Cai, S., Jun, M., & Yang, Z. (2010). Implementing Supply Chain Information Integration in 
China: The Role of Institutional Forces and Trust. Journal of Operations Management, 
28(3), 257-268. 
Carson, S. J. (2007). When to Give up Control of Outsourced New Product Development. 
Journal of Marketing, 71(1), 49-66. 
Carson, S. J., Madhok, A., Varman, R., & John, G. (2003). Information Processing Moderators 
of the Effectiveness of Trust-Based Governance in Interfirm R&D Collaboration. 
Organization Science, 14(1), 45-56. 
Page 40 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
41 
 
Carson, S. J., Madhok, A., & Wu, T. (2006). Uncertainty, Opportunism, and Governance: The 
Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracting Academy of 
Management Journal, 49(5), 1058-1077. 
Cassiman, B., & Veugelers, R. (2002). R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical 
Evidence from Belgium. The American Economic Review, 92(4), 1169-1184. 
Chen, C. C., Peng, M. W., & Saparito, P. A. (2002). Individualism, Collectivism, and 
Opportunism: A Cultural Perspective on Transaction Cost Economics. Journal of 
Management, 28(4), 567-583. 
Clemons, E. K., & Hitt, L. M. (2004). Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: 
Transaction Risks of Information Exchange. Journal of Management Information 
Systems 21(2), 87-107. 
Cohen, M. A., Eliashberg, J., & Ho, T.-H. (1996). New Product Development: The Performance 
and Time-to-Market Tradeoff. Management Science, 42(2), 173-186. 
Das, T. K., & Rahman, N. (2010). Determinants of Partner Opportunism in Strategic Alliances: 
A Conceptual Framework. Journal of Business and Psychology, 25(1), 55-74. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (1996). Risk Types and Inter-Firm Alliance Structures. Journal of 
Management Studies, 33(6), 827-843. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (1998). Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner 
Cooperation in Alliances. The Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 491-512. 
Deeds, D. L., & Hill, C. W. (1999). An Examination of Opportunistic Action within Research 
Alliances: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. Journal of Business Venturing, 
14(2), 141-163. 
Dickson, P. H., Weaver, K. M., & Hoy, F. (2006). Opportunism in the R&D Alliances of Smes: 
The Roles of the Institutional Environment and Sme Size. Journal of Business Venturing, 
21(4), 487-513. 
Dyer, J. H. (1997). Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction Costs 
and Maximize Transaction Value. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 535-556. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. The Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 
660-679. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985). Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches. Management 
Science, 31(2), 134-149. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Tabrizi, B. N. (1995). Accelerating Adaptive Processes: Product Innovation 
in the Global Computer Industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 84-110. 
Ettlie, J. E., & Pavlou, P. A. (2006). Technology-Based New Product Development Partnerships. 
Decision Sciences, 37(2), 117-147. 
Flint, D. J., & Mentzer, J. T. (1997). Validity in Logistics Research. Journal of Business 
Logistics, 18(1), 199-216. 
Flynn, B. B., & Flynn, E. J. (1999). Information-Processing Alternatives for Coping with 
Manufacturing Environment Complexity. Decision Sciences, 30(4), 1021-1052. 
Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships. 
Journal of Marketing, 58(2), 1-19. 
Page 41 of 53 Decision Sciences
For Review Only
42 
 
Garver, M. S., & Mentzer, J. T. (1999). Logistics Research Methods: Employing Structural 
Equation Modeling to Test for Construct Validity. Journal of Business Logistics, 20(1), 
33-58. 
Gelfand, M. J., Spurlock, D., Sniezek, J. A., & Shao, L. (2000). Culture and Social Prediction the 
Role of Information in Enhancing Confidence in Social Predictions in the United States 
and China. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31(4), 498-516. 
Govindarajan, V., & Gupta, A. K. (2001). Strategic Innovation: A Conceptual Road Map. 
Business Horizons, 44(4), 3-12. 
Graham, M. H. (2003). Confronting Multicollinearity in Ecological Multiple Regression. 
Ecology, 84(11), 2809-2815. 
Greenlee, P., & Cassiman, B. (1999). Product Market Objectives and the Formation of Research 
Joint Ventures. Managerial and Decision Economics, 20(3), 115-130. 
Griffith, D. A., Harmancioglu, N., & Droge, C. (2009). Governance Decisions for the Offshore 
Outsourcing of New Product Development in Technology Intensive Markets. Journal of 
World Business, 44(3), 217-224. 
Guillermin, O. (2006). Enabling Automotive Design Innovation for Emerging Composite 
Manufacturing. JEC Composites Magazine, 27, 52-54. 
Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs 
and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
43(4), 781-814. 
Harmancioglu, N. (2009). Portfolio of Controls in Outsourcing Relationships for Global New 
Product Development. Industrial Marketing Management, 38(4), 394-403. 
Hartley, J. L., Zirger, B. J., & Kamath, R. R. (1997). Managing the Buyer-Supplier Interface for 
on-Time Performance in Product Development. Journal of Operations Management, 
15(1), 57-70. 
Hawkins, T. G., Wittmann, C. M., & Beyerlein, M. M. (2008). Antecedents and Consequences of 
Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Relations: Research Synthesis and New Frontiers. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 37(8), 895-909. 
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1990). Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint 
Action in Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(1), 24-36. 
Heide, J. B., & Miner, A. S. (1992). The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated Interaction 
and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 35(2), 265-291. 
Helm, R., & Kloyer, M. (2004). Controlling Contractual Exchange Risks in R&D Interfirm 
Cooperation: An Empirical Study. Research Policy, 33(8), 1103-1122. 
Hoang, H., & Rothaermel, F. T. (2005). The Effect of General and Partner-Specific Alliance 
Experience on Joint R&D Project Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 48(2), 
332-345. 
Hoegl, M., & Gemuenden, G. H. (2001). Teamwork Quality and the Success of Innovative 
Projects: A Theoretical Concept. Organization Science, 12(4), 435-449. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Difference in Work-Related Values. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral Hazard in Teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324-340. 
Jap, D. S. (1999). Pie-Expansion Efforts: Collaboration Processes in Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 461-475. 
Page 42 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
43 
 
Jap, D. S., & Anderson, E. (2003). Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity 
under Ex Post Opportunism Management Science, 49(12), 1684-1701. 
Jap, S. D., & Ganesan, S. (2000). Control Mechanisms and the Relationship Life Cycle: 
Implications for Safeguarding Specific Investments and Developing Commitment. 
Journal of marketing research, 37(2), 227-245. 
Jayaram, J. (2008). Supplier Involvement in New Product Development Projects: Dimensionality 
and Contingency Effects. International Journal of Production Research, 46(13), 3717-
3735. 
Jean, R.-J. B., Kim, D., & Sinkovics, R. R. (2012). Drivers and Performance Outcomes of 
Supplier Innovation Generation in Customer–Supplier Relationships: The Role of Power-
Dependence. Decision Sciences, 43(6), 1003-1038. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
John, G. (1984). An Empirical Investigation of Some Antecedents of Opportunism in a 
Marketing Channel. Journal of marketing research, 21(3), 278-289. 
Johnsen, T. E. (2009). Supplier Involvement in New Product Development and Innovation: 
Taking Stock and Looking to the Future. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 
15(3), 187-197. 
Johnson, J. L., Cullen, J. B., & Sakano, T. (1996). Opportunistic Tendencies in Ijvs with the 
Japanese: The Effects of Culture, Shared Decision Making, and Relationship Age. The 
International Executive, 38(1), 79-94. 
Joshi, A. W., & Arnold, S. J. (1997). The Impact of Buyer Dependence on Buyer Opportunism in 
Buyer–Supplier Relationships: The Moderating Role of Relational Norms. Psychology & 
Marketing, 14(8), 823-845. 
Joshi, A. W., & Stump, R. L. (1999). The Contingent Effect of Specific Asset Investments on 
Joint Action in Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships: An Empirical Test of the 
Moderating Role of Reciprocal Asset Investments, Uncertainty, and Trust. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 27(3), 291-305. 
Kesteloot, K., & Veugelers, R. (1995). Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers. Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy, 4(4), 651-672. 
Kim, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005). Property Rights Theory, Transaction Costs Theory, and 
Agency Theory: An Organizational Economics Approach to Strategic Management. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(4), 223-242. 
Koufteros, X., & Marcoulides, G. A. (2006). Product Development Practices and Performance: 
A Structural Equation Modeling-Based Multi-Group Analysis. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 103(1), 286-307. 
Koufteros, X., Vonderembse, M., & Jayaram, J. (2005). Internal and External Integration for 
Product Development: The Contingency Effect of Uncertainty, Equivocality, and 
Platform Strategy. Decision Sciences, 36(1), 97-133. 
Koufteros, X. A., Rawski, G. E., & Rupak, R. (2010). Organizational Integration for Product 
Development: The Effects on Glitches, on-Time Execution of Engineering Change 
Orders, and Market Success. Decision Sciences, 41(1), 49-80. 
Koufteros, X. A., Vonderembse, M. A., & Doll, W. J. (2002). Integrated Product Development 
Practices and Competitive Capabilities: The Effects of Uncertainty, Equivocality, and 
Platform Strategy. Journal of Operations Management, 20(4), 331-355. 
Page 43 of 53 Decision Sciences
For Review Only
44 
 
Kroes, J. R., & Ghosh, S. (2010). Outsourcing Congruence with Competitive Priorities: Impact 
on Supply Chain and Firm Performance. Journal of Operations Management, 28(2), 124-
143. 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J. (1998). Interdependence, Punitive Capability, and the 
Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in Channel Relationships. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 35(2), 225-235. 
Lambert, D. M., & Harrington, T. C. (1990). Measuring Nonresponse Bias in Customer Service 
Mail Surveys. Journal of Business Logistics, 11(2), 5-25. 
Lawson, B., Petersen, K. J., Cousins, P. D., & Handfield, R. B. (2009). Knowledge Sharing in 
Interorganizational Product Development Teams: The Effect of Formal and Informal 
Socialization Mechanisms. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 26(2), 156-172. 
Lee, D.-J. (1998). Developing International Strategic Alliances between Exporters and 
Importers: The Case of Australian Exporters. International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 15(4), 335-348. 
Levin, D. Z., & Cross, R. (2004). The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating 
Role of Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer. Management Science, 50(11), 1477-
1490. 
Li, D., Eden, L., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. (2008). Friends, Acquaintances, or Strangers? 
Partner Selection in R&D Alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 51(2), 315-334. 
Li, J. J., Poppo, L., & Zhou, K. Z. (2010a). Relational Mechanisms, Formal Contracts, and Local 
Knowledge Acquisition by International Subsidiaries. Strategic Management Journal, 
31(4), 349-370. 
Li, Y., Xie, E., Teo, H.-H., & Peng, M. W. (2010b). Formal Control and Social Control in 
Domestic and International Buyer–Supplier Relationships. Journal of Operations 
Management, 28(4), 333-344. 
Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. (2001). Accounting for Common Method Variance in Cross-
Sectional Research Designs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 114-121. 
Liu, Y., Huang, Y., Luo, Y., & Zhao, Y. (2012). How Does Justice Matter in Achieving Buyer–
Supplier Relationship Performance? Journal of Operations Management, 30(5), 355-367. 
Lubatkin, M., Lane, P. J., Collin, S., & Very, P. (2007). An Embeddedness Framing of 
Governance and Opportunism: Towards a Cross-Nationally Accommodating Theory of 
Agency. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28(1), 43-58. 
Lumineau, F., & Henderson, J. E. (2012). The Influence of Relational Experience and 
Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes. Journal 
of Operations Management(0). 
Luo, Y. (2007). An Integrated Anti-Opportunism System in International Exchange. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(6), 855-877. 
Luo, Y., Liu, Y., Zhang, L., & Huang, Y. (2011). A Taxonomy of Control Mechanisms and 
Effects on Channel Cooperation in China. Academy of Marketing Science. Journal, 39(2), 
307-326. 
Mayer, K. J. (2006). Spillovers and Governance: An Analysis of Knowledge and Reputational 
Spillovers in Information Technology Academy of Management Journal, 49(1), 69-84. 
McCutchen Jr, W. W., Swamidass, P. M., & Teng, B.-S. (2004). R&D Risk-Taking in Strategic 
Alliances: New Explanations for R&D Alliances in the Biopharmaceutical Industry. 
MIR: Management International Review, 44(1), 53-67. 
Page 44 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
45 
 
McDonough, E. F., Kahnb, K. B., & Barczaka, G. (2001). An Investigation of the Use of Global, 
Virtual, and Colocated New Product Development Teams. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 18(2), 110-120. 
McFadyen, M. A., & Cannella, A. A. (2004). Social Capital and Knowledge Creation: 
Diminishing Returns of the Number and Strength of Exchange Relationships. Academy of 
Management Journal, 47(5), 735-746. 
Melander, L. (2012). Supplier Selection and Knowledge Asymmetries in New Product 
Development. 22nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research. 
Ménard, C. (2004). The Economics of Hybrid Organizations. Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics JITE, 160(3), 345-376. 
Miranda, S. M., & Kim, Y.-M. (2006). Professional Versus Political Contexts: Institutional 
Mitigation and the Transaction Cost Heuristic in Information Systems Outsourcing. Mis 
Quarterly, 30(3), 725-753. 
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J. B., & Cort, S. G. (1998). Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency 
Relationships. Journal of marketing research, 35(3), 277-295. 
Mol, M. J. (2005). Does Being R&D Intensive Still Discourage Outsourcing?: Evidence from 
Dutch Manufacturing. Research Policy, 34(4), 571-582. 
Nair, A., Narasimhan, R., & Bendoly, E. (2011). Coopetitive Buyer-Supplier Relationship: An 
Investigation of Bargaining Power, Relational Context, and Investment Strategies. 
Decision Sciences, 42(1), 93. 
Nakata, C., & Sivakumar, K. (1996). National Culture and New Product Development: An 
Integrative Review. Journal of Marketing, 60(1), 61-72. 
Noordewier, T. G., John, G., & Nevin, J. R. (1990). Performance Outcomes of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 
54(4), 80-93. 
O'Leary-Kelly, S. W., & Vokurka, R. J. (1998). The Empirical Assessment of Construct 
Validity. Journal of Operations Management, 16(4), 387-405. 
Olson, E. M., Walker Jr, O. C., & Ruekert, R. W. (1995). Organizing for Effective New Product 
Development: The Moderating Role of Product Innovativeness. The Journal of 
Marketing, 59(1), 48-62. 
Osawa, J., & Mozur, P. (2014). The Rise of China's Innovation Machine. Wall Street Journal. 
Oxley, J. E., & Sampson, R. C. (2004). The Scope and Governance of International R&D 
Alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8‐9), 723-749. 
Park, S. H., & Luo, Y. (2001). Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational 
Networking in Chinese Firms. Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 455-477. 
Parker, D. B., Zsidisin, G. A., & Ragatz, G. L. (2008). Timing and Extent of Supplier Integration 
in New Product Development: A Contingency Approach Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 44(1), 71-83. 
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction Cost 
Examination of Interfirm Cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36(4), 794-
794. 
Perks, H., Kahn, K., & Zhang, C. (2009). An Empirical Evaluation of R&D-Marketing Npd 
Integration in Chinese Firms: The Guanxi Effect. The Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 26(6), 640. 
Petersen, K. J., Handfield, R. B., & Ragatz, G. L. (2003). A Model of Supplier Integration into 
New Product Development. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 20(4), 284-299. 
Page 45 of 53 Decision Sciences
For Review Only
46 
 
Petersen, K. J., Handfield, R. B., & Ragatz, G. L. (2005). Supplier Integration into New Product 
Development: Coordinating Product, Process and Supply Chain Design. Journal of 
Operations Management, 23(3-4), 371-388. 
Pisano, G. P. (1990). The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 35(1), 153-176. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common Method 
Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended 
Remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879-903. 
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as 
Substitutes or Complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707-725. 
Primo, M. A. M., & Amundson, S. D. (2002). An Exploratory Study of the Effects of Supplier 
Relationships on New Product Development Outcomes. Journal of Operations 
Management, 20(1), 33-52. 
Provan, K. G., & Skinner, S. J. (1989). Interorganizational Dependence and Control as Predictors 
of Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations. Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 
202-212. 
Ragatz, G. L., Handfield, R. B., & Scannell, T. V. (1997). Success Factors for Integrating 
Suppliers into New Product Development. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
14(3), 190-202. 
Rajagopal, & Rajagopal, A. (2009). Buyer-Supplier Relationship and Operational Dynamics. The 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 60(3), 313-320. 
Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997). Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future 
Applications. The Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30-54. 
Rinehart, L. M., Eckert, J. A., Handfield, R. B., Page, T. J., & Atkin, T. (2004). An Assessment 
of Supplier—Customer Relationships. Journal of Business Logistics, 25(1), 25-62. 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The American 
Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. 
Saeed, K. A., Malhotra, M. K., & Grover, V. (2011). Interorganizational System Characteristics 
and Supply Chain Integration: An Empirical Assessment*. Decision Sciences, 42(1), 7-
42. 
Sampson, R. C. (2004a). The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 20(2), 484-526. 
Sampson, R. C. (2004b). Organizational Choice in R&D Alliances: Knowledge‐Based and 
Transaction Cost Perspectives. Managerial and Decision Economics, 25(6‐7), 421-436. 
Sampson, R. C. (2007). R&D Alliances and Firm Performance: The Impact of Technological 
Diversity and Alliance Organization on Innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(2), 364-386. 
Schilling, M. A., & Steensma, H. K. (2002). Disentangling the Theories of Firm Boundaries: A 
Path Model and Empirical Test. Organization Science, 13(4), 387-401. 
Shin, H., Collier, D. A., & Wilson, D. D. (2000). Supply Management Orientation and 
Supplier/Buyer Performance. Journal of Operations Management, 18(3), 317-333. 
Sirdeshmukh, D., Singh, J., & Sabol, B. (2002). Consumer Trust, Value, and Loyalty in 
Relational Exchanges. The Journal of Marketing, 66(1), 15-37. 
Sivadas, E., & Dwyer, F. R. (2000). An Examination of Organizational Factors Influencing New 
Product Success in Internal and Alliance-Based Processes. Journal of Marketing, 64(1), 
31-49. 
Page 46 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
47 
 
Skarmeas, D., Katsikeas, C. S., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2002). Drivers of Commitment and Its 
Impact on Performance in Cross-Cultural Buyer-Seller Relationships: The Importer's 
Perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(4), 757-783. 
Sobrero, M., & Roberts, E. B. (2001). The Trade-Off between Efficiency and Learning in 
Interorganizational Relationships for Product Development. Management Science, 47(4), 
493-511. 
Sobrero, M., & Roberts, E. B. (2002). Strategic Management of Supplier–Manufacturer 
Relations in New Product Development. Research Policy, 31(1), 159-182. 
Song, M., & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. (2001). The Effect of Perceived Technological Uncertainty 
on Japanese New Product Development. The Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 
61-80. 
Steenkamp, J. B. E. M., & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing Measurement Invariance in Cross-
National Consumer Research. Journal of consumer research, 25(1), 78-107. 
Stump, R. L., & Heide, J. B. (1996). Controlling Supplier Opportunism in Industrial 
Relationships. Journal of marketing research, 33(4), 431-441. 
Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003). Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Governance. 
The Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 397-415. 
Swink, M. L., & Calantone, R. (2004). Design-Manufacturing Integration as a Mediator of 
Antecedents to New Product Design Quality. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, 51(4), 472-482. 
Swink, M. L., & Mabert, V. A. (2000). Product Development Partnerships: Balancing the Needs 
of Oems and Suppliers. Business Horizons, 43(3), 59-68. 
Takeishi, A. (2001). Bridging Inter- and Intra-Firm Boundaries: Management of Supplier 
Involvement in Automobile Product Development. Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 
403-433. 
Tatikonda, M. V., & Montoya-Weiss, M. M. (2001). Integrating Operations and Marketing 
Perspectives of Product Innovation: The Influence of Organizational Process Factors and 
Capabilities on Development Performance. Management Science, 47(1), 151-172. 
Tatikonda, M. V., & Rosenthal, S. R. (2000). Technology Novelty, Project Complexity, and 
Product Development Project Execution Success: A Deeper Look at Task Uncertainty in 
Product Innovation. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 47(1), 74-87. 
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Polic , 15(6), 285-305. 
Tjosvold, D., Law, K. S., & Sun, H. F. (2003). Collectivistic and Individualistic Values: Their 
Effects on Group Dynamics and Productivity in China. Group Decision and Negotiation, 
12(3), 243-263. 
Ulset, S. (1996). R&D Outsourcing and Contractual Governance: An Empirical Study of 
Commercial R&D Projects. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 30(1), 63-82. 
van Echtelt, F. E. A., Wynstra, F., van Weele, A. J., & Duysters, G. (2008). Managing Supplier 
Involvement in New Product Development: A Multiple-Case Study. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 25(2), 180-201. 
Veugelers, R. (1998). Collaboration in R&D: An Assessment of Theoretical and Empirical 
Findings. De Economist, 146(3), 419-443. 
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011). The Dark Side of Buyer–Supplier 
Relationships: A Social Capital Perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 29(6), 
561-576. 
Page 47 of 53 Decision Sciences
For Review Only
48 
 
Wagner, S. M. (2012). Tapping Supplier Innovation. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 
48(2), 37-52. 
Wagner, S. M., & Kemmerling, R. (2010). Handling Nonresponse in Logistics Research. Journal 
of Business Logistics, 31(2), 357-381. 
Walker, G., & Poppo, L. (1991). Profit Centers, Single-Source Suppliers, and Transaction Costs. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1), 66-87. 
Wallace, D. W., Johnson, J. L., & Umesh, U. (2009). Multichannels Strategy Implementation: 
The Role of Channel Alignment Capabilities*. Decision Sciences, 40(4), 869-900. 
Walter, A. (2003). Relationship-Specific Factors Influencing Supplier Involvement in Customer 
New Product Development. Journal of Business Research, 56(9), 721-733. 
Walton, M. (1997). When Your Partner Fails You. Fortune, 135(10), 87-89. 
Wang, C. X., & Webster, S. (2007). Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk‐
Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss‐Averse Retailer*. Decision Sciences, 38(3), 361-389. 
Wang, Q., Li, J. J., Ross Jr, W. T., & Craighead, C. W. (2013). The Interplay of Drivers and 
Deterrents of Opp rtunism in Buyer–Supplier Relationships. Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 41(1), 111-131. 
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, 
Outcomes, and Solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 36-51. 
Wells, J. D., Campbell, D. E., Valacich, J. S., & Featherman, M. (2010). The Effect of Perceived 
Novelty on the Adoption of Information Technology Innovations: A Risk/Reward 
Perspective. Decision Sciences, 41(4), 813-843. 
Wheelwright, S. C. (1992). Revolutionizing Product Development: Quantum Leaps in Speed, 
Efficiency, and Quality: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. (1985). The Economic Institution of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 36(April ), 453-486. 
Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The Formation of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Detailed 
Contract Drafting and Close Partner Selection. Journal of Marketing, 69(4), 103-117. 
Xie, J., Song, X. M., & Stringfellow, A. (1998). Interfunctional Conflict, Conflict Resolution 
Styles, and New Product Success: A Four-Culture Comparison. Management Science, 
44(12), S192-S206. 
Xin, K. K., & Pearce, J. L. (1996). Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional 
Support. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6), 1641-1658. 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. Organization Science, 9(2), 
141-159. 
Zhao, X., Flynn, B. B., & Roth, A. V. (2006). Decision Sciences Research in China: A Critical 
Review and Research Agenda—Foundations and Overview*. Decision Sciences, 37(4), 
451-496. 
Zhou, K. (in press). Are Relational Ties Always Good for Knowledge Acquisition? Buyer–
Supplier Exchanges in China. Journal of Operations Management. 
 
 
  
Page 48 of 53Decision Sciences
For Review Only
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1)   
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Product 
complexity 
 
3.19 
2.95 
1.05 
0.97 
1.00             
2 Technological 
novelty 
 
3.08 
2.96 
0.83 
0.79 
0.38*** 
0.41*** 
1.00 
 
           
3 Relationship-
specific 
investment  
 
3.02 
3.27 
1.11 
1.13 
0.13 
0.31*** 
0.13* 
0.18** 
1.00 
 
          
4 Coordination 
effort 
 
3.61 
3.62 
1.05 
1.01 
0.08 
0.15* 
0.03 
0.04 
0.47*** 
0.45*** 
1.00          
5 Supplier 
opportunism  
 
1.94 
1.91 
0.95 
0.97 
0.19** 
0.08** 
-0.07 
0.01 
0.13* 
0.15** 
-0.23** 
-0.15* 
1.00         
6 Design quality  
 
 
2.23 
2.85 
1.03 
1.04 
-0.03 
0.16* 
-0.05 
0.21** 
0.21** 
0.23** 
0.21** 
0.22** 
-0.13* 
-0.19* 
1.00        
7 Design  
Efficiency 
 
2.02 
2.54 
1.01 
1.14 
-0.08 
0.04 
-0.03 
0.09 
0.14* 
0.09 
0.08 
0.18* 
-0.16* 
-0.19** 
0.68*** 
0.64*** 
1.00       
8 Firm size 
 
 
11.53 
10.71 
2.84 
3.20 
0.10 
0.09 
-0.03 
0.07 
0.06 
0.03 
0.11 
0.09 
0.05 
-0.00 
-0.16* 
-0.04 
-0.09 
0.03 
1.00      
9 Late supplier  
Involvement 
 
2.24 
2.26 
0.73 
0.70 
0.03 
0.01 
0.17* 
0.09 
0.27*** 
0.30*** 
0.22** 
0.23** 
0.02 
0.07 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.05 
-0.01 
0.07 
0.03 
1.00     
10 Task relevant 
expertise 
 
3.93 
4.06 
0.81 
0.72 
-0.15* 
0.03 
0.13 
0.09 
0.22** 
0.11 
0.21*** 
0.11 
-0.55*** 
-0.44*** 
0.31*** 
0.29*** 
0.30*** 
0.21** 
-0.09 
0.07 
0.09 
0.03 
1.00       
11 Capability 
complementarity 
 
4.08 
4.13 
0.86 
0.82 
-0.09 
0.11 
0.13 
0.09 
0.20** 
0.20** 
0.24** 
0.19** 
-0.55*** 
-0.51*** 
0.26*** 
0.27*** 
0.24*** 
0.22** 
-0.16* 
-0.06 
0.11 
0.17* 
0.65*** 
0.56*** 
1.00   
12 
Trust 
4.04 
4.07 
 
0.82 
0.80 
-0.12 
0.07 
0.08 
-0.03 
0.10 
-0.01 
0.22** 
0.04 
-0.67*** 
-0.19** 
0.13 
-0.01 
0.19** 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
-0.10 
0.58*** 
-0.01 
0.65*** 
0.05 
1.00  
13 
Project size 
1.81 
1.73 
0.87 
0.75 
0.05* 
0.09* 
0.07** 
0.12* 
0.01 
0.04 
0.08 
0.03 
0.04 
0.06 
0.11 
0.02 
0.08 
0.10 
0.01 
0.05* 
0.05 
0.10 
0.12 
0.05 
0.01 
0.06 
0.03 
0.01 
1.00 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001, N(U.S.)=206, N(China)=210 
(1) Italic numbers represent the China sample, while bolded numbers represent the U.S. sample. 
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Table 2: Data validation tests and results 
Validation tests Statistical methods Results 
Measurement invariance  
Two-group SEM (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999; Byrne, 2001; Little, 1997). A test of configural invariance is 
a test of a “weak factorial invariance” null hypothesis (Horn and McArdle 1992) in which the same pattern 
of fixed and free factor loadings is specified for each group. A test of metric invariance (or equal loadings), 
after configural invariance has been confirmed, is that loadings for like items are invariance across 
populations. A test of factor variance invariance is to test whether factor variances are invariant across 
populations. A test of full invariance, after metric invariance has been established, is a test that error 
variances are invariant across populations. 
Configural 
invariance  
RMSEA=0.044, NFI=0.92, CFI=0.97, Chi-square (1973)=2894 
Metric 
invariance  
Chi-square difference (37)=39.48, p-value=0.36 
RMSEA=0.044, NFI=0.91, CFI=0.97 
Factor 
variance 
invariance  
Chi-square difference (10)=8.99, p-value=0.53 
RMSEA=0.045, NFI=0.91, CFI=0.97 
Full 
invariance  
Chi-square difference (44)=160.62, p-value<0.001 
RMSEA=0.045, NFI=0.91, CFI=0.97 
Unidimensionality  
A CFA model with all the 10 latent constructs is tested in the two sub-samples is evaluated (Garver and 
Mentzer, 1999). 
China U.S. 
Chi-square (981)=1542.61 
RMSEA=0.048, 90 percent 
confidence interval for RMSEA 
(0.043, 0.054), P-value 
(RMSEA<0.05)=0.69, SRMR=0.066, 
NNFI=0.97, CFI=0.97, IFI=0.97 
Chi-square (981)=1309.63 
RMSEA=0.035, 90 percent 
confidence interval for RMSEA 
(0.030, 0.041), P-value 
(RMSEA<0.05)=1.00, 
SRMR=0.054, NNFI=0.97, 
CFI=0.97, IFI=0.97 
Discriminant validity  
Chi-square difference tests comparing two models for each of the 45 pairs of the 10 constructs: In the first 
CFA model, the correlation between the constructs is free to vary. In the second, the correlation is fixed to a 
perfect correlation (1.0) (Garver and Mentzer 1999; O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka 1998). Significant chi-
square difference tests suggest discriminant validity. A Bonferroni corrected p-value 0.00093 is used since 
we are performing a number of repeated tests (Byrne 1994, Kroes and Ghosh 2010). 
All the 45 pairs of chi-square difference tests turned out to be significance (p-
value<0.0011), indicating discriminant validity.  
Reliability  
To test reliability, we used both the traditional reliability measures, such as Cronbach’s Alpha, Spearman 
Brown (unequal-length), and Guttman Split-Half, and SEM construct reliability measures, such as construct 
reliability and variance extracted (Garver and Mentzer 1999). 
All the constructs’ Cronbach’s Alpha are higher than, indicating reliable 
scales (Garver and Mentzer 1999). In addition, all the scales have Spearman 
Brown coefficients higher than 0.70 and Guttman Split-Half scores higher 
than 0.60. All the SEM construct reliability scores higher than 0.70 and 
variance extraction scores higher than 0.50 (Garver and Mentzer 1999). 
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Table 3: SEM analysis results (1)   
 
Direct model (β)  Proposed model (β)  Full model (β)  
China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. 
Hypotheses-testing Pathes  
  Product complexity-Supplier opportunism   0.11* 0.17* 0.76* 1.49* 
  Technological novelty-Supplier opportunism   -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.06 
  Mutual Relationship-specific investment-Supplier 
opportunism 
  0.12* 0.22** 0.33* 0.66* 
  Coordination efforts-Supplier opportunism   -0.11* -0.22** -0.40* -0.81* 
  Supplier opportunism-Design quality   -0.17* -0.17* -0.39* -0.27* 
  Supplier opportunism-Design efficiency   -0.25* -0.22* -0.43* -0.26* 
  Product complexity-Design quality -2.65** -4.09**   -2.42* -3.63* 
  Technological novelty-Design quality -3.23** -3.41**   -3.38** -3.35** 
  Mutual Relationship-specific investment-Design quality 1.01* 0.91*   1.10* 1.14* 
  Coordination efforts-Design quality 0.94* 1.52**   1.11* 1.73** 
  Product complexity-Design efficiency -3.13** -3.75**   -2.68** -3.42** 
  Technological novelty-Design efficiency -3.15** -3.81**   -3.25** -3.53** 
  Mutual Relationship-specific investment-Design 
efficiency 
0.86* 1.19*   1.13* 1.35* 
  Coordination efforts-Design efficiency 1.46* 2.05**   1.28* 1.82** 
Control variables       
  Firm size-Design quality 0.72* 0.64* 0.03 -0.05 0.72* 0.76* 
  Firm size-Design efficiency 0.61* 0.81* 0.07 0.06 0.65* 0.89* 
  Firm size-Supplier opportunism   -0.04 0.01 -0.22 -0.35 
  Project size-Design quality 0.22* 0.46* 0.15* 0.09* 0.24* 0.49* 
  Project size-Design efficiency  0.35 0.32 -0.08 -0.04 0.33 0.41 
  Project size-Supplier opportunism    0.04 0.04 0.11 0.13 
  Late supplier involvement-Design quality -0.70* -1.05** -0.15* -0.10 0.74 -1.23** 
  Late supplier involvement-Design efficiency 0.72* -1.07** -0.12 -0.08 -0.75* -1.20** 
  Late supplier involvement-Supplier opportunism   0.05 0.14** 0.27 0.56* 
  Task relevant expertise-Design quality 1.74** 1.34* 0.27** 0.10 1.74** 1.45* 
  Task relevant expertise-Design efficiency 1.65** 1.53* 0.23* -0.05 1.67** 1.67* 
  Task relevant expertise-Supplier opportunism   -0.15* -0.18* 0.23 0.59 
  Capability complementarity-Design quality 0.36 0.67 0.24** 0.36** 0.47 1.17* 
  Capability complementarity-Design efficiency 0.46 0.78 0.15 0.39** 0.57 1.30* 
  Capability complementarity-Supplier opportunism   -0.17 -0.53** -0.27 -0.81** 
  Trust-Design quality -0.14 -0.10 0.18* -0.04 -0.29 -0.07 
  Trust-Design efficiency 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 
  Trust-Supplier opportunism   -0.50*** -0.13* -0.49*** -0.11 
R2       
Supplier opportunism   0.51 0.58 0.56 0.68 
Design quality 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.30 
Design efficiency 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.26 
Global (2-group) goodness of fit  
χ2 3611.09 3739.44 3583.17 
df 2404 2406 2391 
χ2 /df 1.50 1.55 1.50 
RMSEA 0.046 0.049 0.045 
CFI 0.96 0.96 0.96 
NFI 0.91 0.90 0.90 
IFI 0.96 0.96 0.96 
AIC 3960.13 4099.23 3961.30 
Group goodness of fit  
SRMR 0.078 0.071 0.083 0.075 0.079 0.070 
GFI 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.88 
(1) All the numbers are standardized path coefficients. (S) signifies significant differences of the coefficients in the 
two samples. *p<0.05, **p<0.01,***p<0.001, n (China)=210, n(U.S.)=206
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Table 4: Results of the chi-square difference tests for Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 
Hypotheses 
Standardized path 
coefficient in the 
baseline model 
The path constrained to be equal 
Chi-square 
difference 
statistics p-value Result China U.S. 
H4a 0.11 0.17 
Product complexity->Supplier 
opportunism 
Chi-square 
(1)=3.91 
0.05 Supported 
H4b n.s. n.s. 
Technological novelty->Supplier 
opportunism 
Chi-square 
(1)=1.52 
0.22 
Not 
supported 
H5a -0.11 -0.22 
Coordination effort->Supplier 
opportunism 
Chi-square 
(1)=4.96 
0.03 Supported 
H5b 0.12 0.22 
Mutual Relationship-specific 
investment->Supplier opportunism 
Chi-square 
(1)=5.85 
0.02 
Not 
supported 
H6a -0.17 -0.17 
Supplier opportunism->Design 
quality 
Chi-square 
(1)=1.12 
0.29 
Not 
supported 
H6b -0.25 -0.22 
Supplier opportunism->Design 
efficiency 
Chi-square 
(1)=4.75 
0.03 Supported 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Results  
             U.S.            China 
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